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Criminal Procedure: Expungement of Arrest Records
R.D.K. was arrested in 1974 after police found several bags of
marijuana at his residence.' At a pretrial hearing, the state district
court sustained a motion to suppress this evidence, and the prosecu-
tion moved for dismissal of the charge. In 1961, G.E.S., a minor, was
arrested for felonious use of an automobile without permission of the
owner.2 He pled guilty and served sixteen months in a reformatory.
His civil rights were restored upon his discharge, 3 and he had no
subsequent criminal record. R.L.F. was stripping a car when appre-
hended by police in 1967.1 He pled guilty to the misdemeanor of
tampering with an automobile 5 and was sentenced to ninety days in
the county workhouse.
Each of these three arrestees successfully moved, in state district
court, for an order expunging8 the records of his arrest.7 On appeal
by the state, the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the expunge-
ments for R.D.K. and G.E.S., but reversed with respect to R.L.F.,'
1. In re R.L.F., 256 N.W.2d 803, 804 (Minn. 1977). RD.K. was charged with
felonious possession of a Schedule I controlled substance in violation of MNN. STAT. §
152.09(1), (2) (1976).
2. 256 N.W.2d at 806. G.E.S. was charged under MNN. STAT. § 168.49 (1961),
as amended, MmN. STAT. §§ 609.55, .605(10) (1976).
3. Pursuant to MIwN. STAT. § 242.31 (1976), a juvenile convicted of a felony or
gross misdemeanor who is discharged before the expiration of the maximum term of
commitment may be restored "to all civil rights." This includes a setting aside and
nullification of conviction and a purging of all penalties and disabilities arising from
such conviction.
4. See Brief for Appellant app., at A-3, In re R.L.F., 256 N.W.2d 803 (Minn.
1977) (State's brief in State v. R.L.F.) (Affidavit of R.L.F., Dec. 13, 1975).
5. See MN. STAT. § 609.605 (10) (1976).
6. Expunge: "to destroy or obliterate; it implies not a legal act, but a physical
annihilation .... To blot out; to efface designedly; to obliterate; to strike out wholly."
BLAcK's LAW DCTIONARY 693 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
Courts and statutes use the term "expunge" loosely to refer to any of a variety of
methods employed to cancel or revoke criminal records. It can mean actual destruction
of the records, their surrender to the arrestee, obliteration of the arrestee's name upon
the record, or sealing of the records in a confidential file. Regardless of the actual
technique used, the desired effect of expungement is to remove the arrestee's record
from current law enforcement files and from public scrutiny. See, e.g.. Grandison v.
Warden, 423 F. Supp. 112 (D. Md. 1976); State v. Chambers, 533 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975).
7. In addition to ordering R.L.F.'s arrest record expunged, the district court also
set aside his 1967 conviction. 256 N.W.2d at 807; see note 62 infra.
8. The noun "expungement" is not recognized by Webster's Third International
Dictionary. The nominative form of the verb "expunge" is "expunction." However,
since most courts have adopted the neologism, this Comment will conform to that
usage.
9. See note 62 infra.
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holding that without statutory authorization for the expungement
"the court's inherent power is limited to instances where the peti-
tioner's constitutional rights may be seriously infringed by retention
of his records." In re R.L.F., 256 N.W.2d 803, 808 (Minn. 1977).
Recent case law reveals a judicial ambivalence about the ex-
pungement of arrest records. This ambivalence results from two con-
flicting policy concerns: social order and individual rights.' Soaring
crime rates demonstrate the need for potent law enforcement. Arrest
records" are an effective means of criminal identification and there-
fore play an important role in the law enforcement effort. Finger-
prints and mugshots have obvious value in criminal identification,
and retained arrest reports aid investigations by revealing geographic
patterns, modi operandi, and other tendencies established by past
behavior leading to arrest.' 3 Computer technology and advanced
methods of telecommunication have greatly increased the law en-
forcement value of arrest record retention." Huge data files may now
10. See generally Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with
Fair and Effective Law Enforcement?, 23 U. KAN. L. Rsv. 1, 2 (1974):
[Tihe most difficult cases to decide have been those in which two competing
values, each able to marshal respectable claims on its behalf, meet in a
contest in which one must prevail over the other. The classical case is proba-
bly the recurring paradox of a government that prides itself both on being
responsive to the public will and on its concern for individual liberty: the
conflict between freedom and order. Unregulated freedom is anarchy, and
absolute order is despotism. A free society seeks to achieve a compromise
between these two extremes in which substantial amounts of individual lib-
erty may subsist in a society in which public order is preserved.
See also Nizer, The Right of Privacy: A Half Century's Development, 39 MIcH. L. REv.
526, 529 (1941).
11. In this Comment "arrest record" will refer not only to identification data,
such as photographs and fingerprints taken at the time of arrest, but also to all writ-
ten records made contemporaneously with the arrest, including the arrestee's name
and address, the time and place of arrest, and the reason for the arrest. This informa-
tion is considered a matter of public record. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 15.162(2a), (6a)
(1976). Subsequent investigative information constitutes a part of the final arrest
record but is usually treated as confidential. See, e.g., id. § 15.162(2a). If the arrest
results in conviction, the entire record becomes a "criminal record," although that
portion of the file collected before the conviction may still be referred to as the record
of arrest. See Comment, Retention and Dissemination of Arrest Records: Judicial
Response, 38 U. CH. L. REv. 850, 852 n.ll (1971).
12. See, e.g., Security and Privacy of Criminal Arrest Records: Hearings on H.R.
13315 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 173 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 13315].
13. See, e.g., id. at 174 (" '[AIII modern police agencies use their arrest records
to analyze high crime areas and plan enforcement programs and patrol procedures.' ")
(statement of Quinn Tamm, Executive Director, International Association of Chiefs
of Police).
14. See generally INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES, TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY (1967) (a report to The President's Commission on Law Enforcement
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be effectively managed, and information moves instantaneously
among local police forces, state crime bureaus, and the FBI."5
On the other hand, retention and widespread dissemination of
arrest record information pose an increasing threat to the individual
arrestee. Arrest is the first in a series of "status degradation ceremo-
nies" in the criminal process. 6 Retention of arrest records perpetu-
ates the degradation, and dissemination makes it inescapable. A
record of arrest, whether the arrest results in conviction or not, may
permanently stigmatize an individual. 7 Within the system of law
enforcement and administration, the arrestee is more susceptible to
future police harassment, rearrest, and unfavorable sentencing and
parole decisions." The most serious effects of arrest, however, occur
in the community. The wide dissemination of arrest records outside
law enforcement circles"8 adversely affects the arrestee's ability to
and Administration of Justice) [hereinafter cited as ScIENcE AND TECHNOLOGY].
15. "The FBI Identification Division maintains criminal records for some 21.4
million individuals." Tarlton v. Saxbe, 407 F. Supp. 1083, 1084 (D.D.C. 1976). "During
Fiscal 1970, the Identification Division processed 29,000 fingerprint cards daily, of
which 13,000 were arrest submissions.. . from the approximately 8,000 contributing
[federal, state, and local] agencies .... " Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1022
(D.C. Cir. 1974). The Bureau's records may be "disseminated upon request to over
14,500 public and private agencies." Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467, 471 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
16. See generally Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies,
61 AM. J. Soc. 420 (1956); see also Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the
Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE
L.J. 543, 590 (1960).
17. Cf. Karabian, Record of Arrest: The Indelible Stain, 3 PAc. L.J. 20,36 (1972)
(use of arrest records by employers).
18. See, e.g., Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 127, 503 P.2d 157, 159 (1972).
19. See generally Hearings on H.R. 13315, supra note 12; see also Booth, The
Expungement Myth, 38 L.A. B. BULL. 161, 163 (1963); Comment, supra note 11, at 853.
Booth lists four original sources of arrest record dissemination in California: the FBI.
the California Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation (equivalent to the
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA)), the local police force, and the
court with jurisdiction over the case. Dissemination to non-law enforcement recipients
takes place at each level.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1970), the Attorney General is empowered to collect
arrest information and exchange it "with, and for the official use of, authorized officials
of the Federal Government, the States, cities, and penal and other institutions." The
efficacy of this limitation is doubtful at best. The FBI is required to give arrest records
to federally insured banking institutions, see 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(b) (1976), and at one
time was also required to give such records to state employment and licensing bureaus.
See Department of Justice Appropriation Act, 1973, Pub. L. No. 92-544, tit. 11,86 Stat.
1114 (1972).
Limits on dissemination by state and local sources are also minimal. Under the
Minnesota Data Privacy Act, MIN. STAT. §§ 15.162-.169 (1976), data on individuals
are categorized as public, private, or confidential. Recent legislation in Minnesota
specifically made arrest information a matter of public record, although subsequent
1978]
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secure employment ° and is prejudicial to his social, economic, and
psychological well-being." For the convicted arrestee, this means that
punishment does not end after the sentence is served.2 For the exon-
erated arrestee, it means that society imposes a punishment though
the law does not. 3 Since the number of arrests in the United States
exceeds nine and one half million per year,2" the magnitude of the
investigative files are confidential. See id. § 15.162. State agencies have a duty to
disseminate records to non-law enforcement recipients under certain statutes dealing
with licensing. See, e.g., id. § 326.334(2). Since court calendars and files are open to
the public, arrest information may leave the law enforcement sphere at this point, too.
See Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 1977).
20. Studies have indicated that a majority of employers flatly refuse to hire an
individual with an arrest record, whether or not the arrest ended in conviction. See,
e.g., Schwartz & Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 Soc. PnoB. 133 (1962).
reprinted in THE OTHER SIDE: PERSPECTIVES ON DEVIANCE 103, 110 (H. Becker ed. 1964).
See also Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 742-43 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In
Morrow, Judge Skelly Wright discussed the "disastrous effect" that an arrest record
may have on an individual's employability. 417 F.2d at 742 (citing REPORT OF TUE
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE EFFEcrs OF POLICE ARREST RECORDS ON UNEMPLOYMENT
IN THE DIsTincT OF COLUMBIA (1967)[hereinafter cited as DUNCAN REPORT]).
Two of the respondents in R.L.F. were well aware of this effect. R.L.F. sought
expungement because he wanted a job with a local police force and felt that his ol
arrest record would prevent him from being hired. See 256 N.W.2d at 807. G.E.S.
sought expungement because he wished to join the armed services and a full criminal
record check is standard procedure for new recruits. See Brief for Appellant app., at
A-2, In re R.L.F., 256 N.W.2d 803 (Minn. 1977) (State's brief in State v. G.E.S.)
(Affidavit of G.E.S., Feb. 10, 1976).
21. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 13315, supra note 12, at 31 (testimony of Charles
T. Duncan); DUNCAN REPORT, supra note 20; Schwartz & Skolnick, supra note 20. See
generally Haskel, The Arrest Record and New York City Public Hiring: An Evaluation,
9 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROS. 442 (1973); Schiavo, Condemned by the Record. 55
A.B.A.J. 540 (1969); Note, Discrimination on the Basis of Arrest Records, 56 CORNEL IL
L. REV. 470 (1971); Note, Removing the Stigma of Arrest: The Courts, The Legislature
and Unconvicted Arrestees, 47 WASH. L. REv. 659 (1972); Comment, Criminal Records
of Arrest and Conviction: Expungement from the General Public Access, 3 CAL. W.L.
REv. 121 (1967).
22. See Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and
Adult Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147, 148.
23. See, e.g., Note, Criminal Procedure: Expunging the Arrest Records When
There Is No Conviction, 28 OKLA. L. REv. 377, 378 (1975) (footnotes omitted):
Although cleared under the law, his record will not be cleared, and this
charge may serve as a cloud on any future opportunities the individual might
have. The practice of keeping arrest records creates a potential "record
prison" for millions of Americans when past mistakes, omissions, and misun-
derstood activities become permanent evidence, capable of influencing the
individual's life for decades.
24. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN TIIE UNITED
STATES 1976: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 170 (1977) ("In 1976, law enforcement agencies
made an estimated 9.6 million arrests nationally for all criminal acts except traffic




The determination of whether arrest records should be expunged
requires, therefore, a balancing of the law enforcement value of re-
taining a record against the detrimental effect that retention may
have on the individual arrestee.21 Weighing these concerns, courts
have arrived at varying conclusions.2' A substantial number have
held that balancing is a legislative task and that expungement should
be limited to cases provided for by statute.? Other courts have denied
Hess & LePoole, Abuse of the Record of Arrest Not Leading to Conviction, 13 CIM.iF
& DELINQUENCY 494, 494 (1966) (By a "'conservative'" estimate, "'about 40 percent
of the male children living in the United States today will be arrested for a non-traific
offense sometime in their lives.' ") (quoting THE PRESIDEN"S Co.ussio. ON LAw E.N-
FORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY
247 (1967)).
25. The problem is exacerbated by the increased range and scope of dissemina-
tion that computers have made possible. "Heretofore, the inherent inefficiencies of
manual files containing millions of names have provided a built-in protection. Accessi-
bility will be greatly enhanced by putting the files in a computer, so that the protection
afforded by inefficiency will diminish, and special attention must be directed at pro-
tecting privacy." SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 74.
26. See generally C6mment, supra note 11. Some commentators have argued
that, regardless of where the balance is ultimately struck, expungement is an inappro-
priate remedy for safeguarding individual rights. See, eg., Kogon & Loughery, Sealing
and Expungement of Criminal Records - The Big Lie, 61 J. Cawt. L.C. & P.S. 378
(1970). Kogon and Loughery criticize expungement of records both in principle and in
fact. They argue that, in principle, expungement is nothing more than a state sanc-
tioned lie and, in fact, it does not work because records always leave some trace that
makes the expunged information retrievable. See id. at 383. Thus, they conclude.
The only way to breach the barriers standing in the way of an offender's
reintegration into society is to assault them frontally. The remedy lies in a
radically different approach - leaving the record alone while constantly
striving to improve its quality, and mounting an educational program, with
statutory supports, designed to liberalize public attitudes toward offenders.
Id. at 391.
27. See generally Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 900 (1972).
28. See, e.g., Herschel v. Dyra, 365 F.2d 17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 973
(1966); Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 553 P.2d 624, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464
(1976); Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962);
Mulkey v. Purdy, 234 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1970); Kolb v. O'Connor, 14 1l. App. 2d 81, 142
N.E.2d 818 (1957); Statman v. Kelly, 47 Misc. 2d 294, 262 N.Y.S.2d 799 (Sup. Ct.
1965); State v. Bellar, 16 N:C. App. 339, 192 S.E.2d 86 (1972).
Many states have legislation enabling courts to act with regard to various aspects
of the records of specified classes of individuals: youthful offenders, see. e.g.. CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 781 (West Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. § 39.12(2) (1975); KAN. STAT.
§ 21-4616 (Supp. 1976); pardoned, first time offenders, see, e.g.. MIN. STAT. § 638.02
(1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.14 (1975); and exonerated arrestees, see, e.g., Amz.
REv. STAT. § 13-1761 (Supp. 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-90 (1975); FLA. STAT. §
901.33 (1975); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 206-5 (1973); IoWA CODE § 749.2 (1977); Mici.
CoMp. LAws § 28.243 (1970); MINN. STAT. § 299C.11 (1976); Morer. 11Ev. CODES ANN. §
80-2003 (Supp. 1965); NEv. REv. STAT. § 179.255 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 593.4




the existence of judicial power to order expungement, but have been
willing to restrain dissemination of arrest information." A third group
has ordered expungement, but only in "extreme circumstances."Y'
Finally, certain courts have claimed that the power to order expunge-
ment is entirely within their inherent equitable powers and that deci-
sions to expunge may be based upon a purely judicial balancing of
the equities in each case. 3'
In re R.L.F.32 apparently aligns Minnesota with jurisdictions lim-
iting the court's inherent expungement power to cases involving ex-
treme circumstances. 3 The court did exhibit a willingness to broadly
construe Minnesota's expungement statutes, but absent statutory
authority, the Minnesota district courts may not order expungement
except where necessary to remedy "a serious infringement" of consti-
tutional rights. Thus, though R.L.F. arguably expands the power of
the courts where there is some statutory basis for expungement, it
places significant limitations on the inherent judicial powers. This
Comment will examine the court's decision in order to trace and
evaluate the parameters of these expungement guidelines.
R.D.K.'s arrest record was expunged pursuant to section 299C.11
of the Minnesota Statutes.m Section 299C.11 empowers the Minne-
sota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) 35 to receive felony and
gross misdemeanor arrest data from sheriffs and police chiefs across
the state. It provides, however, that
[uipon the determination of all pending criminal actions or pro-
ceedings in favor of the arrested person, he shall, upon demand,
have all such finger and thumb prints, photographs, and other iden-
29. This has been the position of the federal courts in the District of Columbia
since the Duncan Report. See, e.g., Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Tarlton v. Saxbe, 407
F. Supp. 1083 (D.D.C. 1976). See generally DUNCAN REPORT, supra note 20.
30. This is the position generally taken by the federal courts. See, e.g., Urban v.
Breier, 401 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. Wis. 1975); United States v. Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75
(E.D. Pa. 1973).
31. See, e.g., Bradford v. Mahan, 219 Kan. 450, 548 P.2d 1223 (1976); Diorio v.
City of Utica, 85 Misc. 2d 374, 380 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Utica City Ct. 1976).
32. 256 N.W.2d 803 (Minn. 1977).
33. Although the court thus appears to reserve a modicum of discretion in ex-
punging arrest records, as a practical matter the "extreme circumstances" that are the
precondition for its exercise will rarely, if ever, be found to exist. See notes 89-94 infra
and accompanying text.
34. 256 N.W.2d at 804-06.
35. The BCA is a statewide law enforcement agency established by chapter 299C
of the Minnesota Statutes (1976). It acts as a repository and processing center for
criminal records and investigatory data in cooperation with all local law enforcement
bodies in the state. It also serves as a link in nationwide crime information systems.
See MINN. STAT. § 299C.01(4) (1976). Its members may conduct investigations and
make arrests with the same powers as a sheriff. See id. § 299C.03.
[Vol. 62:229
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tification data, and all copies and duplicates thereof, returned to
him, provided it is not established that he has been convicted of any
felony, either within or without the state, within the period of ten
years immediately preceding such determination.?
In affirming the order to expunge R.D.K.'s arrest record, the
Minnesota Supreme Court broadened the literal reach of section
299C.11 in three ways. First, the court construed "determination of
all pending criminal proceedings in favor of the arrested person" to
mean determination in any way except conviction.3 The court
reached this result by comparing section 299C.11 to section 152.18 of
the Minnesota Statutes, which authorizes arrest record expungement
for convicted drug offenders who complete an educational program.
The legislative intent is explicit in section 152.18: rehabilitation war-
rants restoration of the first time offender to his prearrest status.'
The R.L.F. court reasoned that if a convicted drug arrestee is eligible
for expungement, a fortiori, a nonconvicted drug arrestee should also
be eligible 39
The Minnesota court's analogy to rehabilitated drug offenders is
not a particularly firm basis for an interpretation of section 299C.11.11
36. Id. § 299C.11.
37. See 256 N.W.2d at 805. This construction may be inferred from the opinion
since the court applied section 299C.11 to R.D.K., who was not convicted, but not to
R.L.F., who was. It is odd, however, that the court did not cite City of St. Paul v.
Froysland, 246 N.W.2d 435 (Minn. 1976), the only other decision that has construed
section 299C.11. In that case, the court refused to extend section 299C.11 to an arrestee
who pled guilty, but whose conviction was set aside after the successful completion
of a probationary period. The Froysland court reasoned that the "assumption of a
defendant's innocence, which would ordinarily be concluded from acquittal or dis.
missal of charges, does not result when, as in the case at bar, the guilt of a crime is
admitted." Id. at 439.
38. MiNN. STAT. § 152.18(2) (1976) provides,
If the court determines, after hearing, that such person was discharged and
the proceedings against him dismissed, it shall enter [an] order [of ex-
pungement]. The effect of the order shall be to restore the person, in the
contemplation of the law, to the status he occupied before such arrest or
indictment or information.
39. A New Jersey court applied similar reasoning in construing a similar provi-
sion. See In re Fortenbach, 119 N.J. Super. 124, 128, 290 A.2d 315, 317 (Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1972) ("Clearly, then, since the statute authorizes, under certain conditions, the
expungement of a conviction for 'lewdness,' a fortiori why not the arrest? Here the
maxim omne majus continet in se minus. .. 'The greater contains the less,' seems
appropriate.").
40. It is not at all clear that the policy reasons supporting expungement for a
rehabilitated drug offender also support expungement for an arrestee who has not been
convicted. The reasons for expungement of a nonconvicted arrestee's record seem to
be related to the presumption of innocence and an assessment of potential usefulness
of the record. See notes 10-26 supra and accompanying text. The reasons for expunge-
ment of the rehabilitated drug offender's record under MINN. STAT. § 152.18 (1976) are
more related to extrinsic policies: encouraging rehabilitation and reform.
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Moreover, a number of courts from other jurisdictions have specifi-
cally declined to engage in an expansive reading of similar statutes."
Nevertheless, the court's liberal construction of section 299C.11 is
justified for reasons not mentioned in the opinion.
Section 299C.10 of the Minnesota Statutes requires local law
enforcement agencies to collect arrest records for the use of the BCA.
But section 299C.09, which describes the sort of identification records
the Bureau is to maintain, speaks only of "information [concerning]
• . .persons who have been or shall hereafter be convicted of a felony,
gross misdemeanor, or an attempt to commit a felony or gross misde-
meanor, within the state, or who are known to be habitual crimi-
nals." 2 Since section 299C.09 does not refer to unconvicted arrestees,
it appears that there is no specific statutory authorization for the
retention of arrest information collected under section 299C.10 unless
the arrest results in conviction. Moreover, since the denigrating effect
of an arrest record has become a matter of judicial notice,43 a failure
of the courts to protect arrestees not convicted of any crime from the
burden of this stigma would seem to be inconsistent with the pre-
sumption of innocence."
The second way in which the court expanded section 299C.11 in
its affirmance of expungement for R.D.K. was by construing the pro-
vision for return of "finger and thumb prints, photographs, and other
identification data" to include, by implication, the entire arrest rec-
ord. 5 In 1976, the Minnesota Supreme Court had noted in City of
St. Paul v. Froysland6 "that Minn.St. 299C.11 is directed only to the
return of identification data and not all records relating to arrest."17
But the R.L.F. court neither mentioned Froysland nor articulated the
rationale for expanding its interpretation of the statute. The court
41. Some courts have held, for example, that expungement is inappropriate
when criminal proceedings terminate with any finding other than not guilty. See
Richard S. v. City of New York, 32 N.Y.2d 592, 300 N.E.2d 426, 347 N.Y.S.2d 54
(1973); People v. Michael L., 80 Misc. 2d 292, 362 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Dist. Ct. 1975); People
v. DeGaugh, 84 Misc. 2d 1, 374 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Rochester City Ct. 1975). Where the
defendant is not acquitted, the continued law enforcement value of the arrest record
arguably justifies its retention.
42. MINN. STAT. § 299C.09 (1976).
43. See, e.g., Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 127, 503 P.2d 157, 159 (1972)
(referring to aspects of an arrest record's detrimental effect as "common knowledge").
See also notes 16-25 supra and accompanying text.
44. See Hess & LePoole, supra note 24, at 502 ("While the United States claims
it respects the right to presumption of innocence, it has not fully realized that the very
essence of the presumption of innocence requires that it be applied in all cases where
the person has not been adjudicated guilty."). But see Comment, supra note 11, at 857.
45. 256 N.W.2d at 805.
46. 246 N.W.2d 435 (Minn. 1976), discussed at note 80 infra.
47. Id. at 439 n.5.
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simply stated, "We hold that such a statute implicitly includes the
arrest records."4
Two factors justify this construction. First, reading section
299C.11 to reach the entire record best promotes the goal of fully
restoring the arrestee's prearrest status that the court attributed to
the statute. 9 Second, limiting the return to identification materials
can at most protect the exonerated arrestee from public display of
his photograph. As the court noted, information gathered at the time
of arrest or incarceration is not protected by the Minnesota Data
Privacy Act, 5 and nothing prevents public dissemination of the
fact of arrest.-" Including arrest records within the ambit of the
statute seems necessary, therefore, to provide complete relief to an
unconvicted arrestee.
The court's third expansion of section 299C.11 was the applica-
tion of the statute to all law enforcement agencies that gather arrest
information in the state and not just to the BCA.1 Although section
299C.11 is located in the chapter of the Minnesota Statutes dealing
with the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, the court was justified in
not limiting its application to that agency. Because records existing
in local files can be just as damaging to the exonerated arrestee as
48. 256 N.W.2d at 805.
49. Drawing a parallel to MNN. STAT. § 152.18 (1976), the court attributed that
statute's goal of restoring an arrestee to his prearrest status, see note 38 supra, to the
terms of MINN. STAT. § 299C.11 (1976). See 256 N.W.2d at 805-06 ("we must conclude
that Minn.St. 299C.11 clearly was intended to wipe his slate clean").
50. See 256 N.W.2d at 805; MINN. STAT. § 15.162(la), (2a), (5a) (1976). The usual
rationale for making arrest records available for public inspection is the prevention of
secret arrest. See Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728,741-42 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(explaining a similar provision in the District of Columbia); Proposed Amendments
to sections 15.162-.163 of the Minnesota Statutes (Supp. 1975): Hearings on H.F. No.
2204 Before the Subcomm. on Probate and Real Estate of the House Comm. on Judici-
ary, 69th Minn. Legis., 1976 Sess. (March 1, 1976) (tape recordings on file at Minnesota
Hous- of Representatives archives). Ironically, this availability of arrest records, in-
tended to protect the arrestee, also works to his disadvantage in many situations. See
notes 16-25 supra and accompanying text.
51. Obviously, written records of arrest may be just as damaging to the arrestee
as photographs, since they contain his name, age, and address, the nature of the
charge, and the place of arrest. See generally MINN. STAT. § 15.162(la) (1976). All of
this information would remain available to the public, despite the return of photo-
graphs. See Op. Mom-. A-r'Y GEN. 852 (Aug. 2, 1976).
52. See 256 N.W.2d at 805. Several jurisdictions have interpreted statutes simi-
lar to MINN. STAT. § 299C.11 (1976) to apply only to state crime bureaus. In Kolb v.
O'Connor, 14 I1. App. 2d 81, 142 N.E.2d 818 (1957), and again in People v. Lewerenz,
421 Ill. App. 2d 410, 192 N.E.2d 401 (1963), for example, Illinois courts construed an
analogous statute to empower courts to expunge records held by the state's Depart-
ment of Public Safety, but not those held by municipal police. A Washington state
court reached a similar result in the more recent case of State v. Adler, 16 Wash. App.
459, 558 P.2d 817 (1976).
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those held by state agencies, such a limitation would clearly fall short
of restoring the arrestee to his prearrest status.53
Expungement of the arrest record of G.E.S. was ordered pur-
suant to section 242.31 of the Minnesota Statutes,5" which provides
for restoration of civil rights to juvenile offenders. The terms of the
statute do not explicitly empower a court to order expungement of
arrest records, but the court read such authorization into a provision
allowing an order to "purge and free [the defendant] from all penal-
ties and disabilities arising from . . . conviction." '55
Although some courts have arrived at different interpretations of
similar statutes," the Minnesota court's construction seems, in light
of a complementary statutory provision57 and basic policy considera-
tions, to be justified. Section 638.02 of the Minnesota Statutes allows
the board of pardons to grant a "pardon extraordinary" to certain
qualified petitioners. When such a pardon has been granted, "the
district court of the county in which the conviction occurred . . . [is
to] order the conviction set aside and all records pertinent to the
conviction sealed. . . . The term 'records' shall include but is not
limited to all matters, files, documents and papers incident to the
arrest .. ."58
The policy underlying section 638.02 is manifest. Existence of an
arrest record is a disability that can only be cured by expungement
53. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
54. See 256 N.W.2d at 806. MINN. STAT. § 242.31 (1976) provides,
Whenever a person committed to the [Minnesota corrections] author-
ity upon conviction of a crime is discharged from its control other than by
expiration of the maximum term of commitment . . . or by termination of
its control under the provisions . . . [allowing for release on the person's
twenty-fifth birthday], such discharge shall, when so ordered by the author-
ity, restore such person to all civil rights and shall have the effect of setting
aside the conviction and nullifying the same and of purging such person
thereof. . . .
Such orders restore the defendant to his civil rights and purge and free
him from all penalties and disabilities arising from such conviction and it
shall not thereafter be used against him, except in a criminal prosecution for
a subsequent offense if otherwise admissible therein.
55. See 256 N.W.2d at 806; MINN. STAT. § 242.31 (1976).
56. See, e.g., United States v. McMains, 540 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1976) (construing
18 U.S.C.A. § 5021(b) (West Supp. 1977)) (provision for setting aside juvenile convic-
tions under the Federal Youth Corrections Act does not authorize expungement of
criminal records); note 61 infra.
57. Compare MINN. STAT. § 242.31 (1976), quoted at note 54 supra, with
id. § 638.02(2) (1976) ("Such pardon extraordinary, when granted, shall have the
effect of restoring such person to all civil rights, and shall have the effect of setting
aside the conviction and nullifying the same and purging such person thereof .... .
See also note 71 infra.
58. MINN. STAT. § 638.02(3), (5) (1976).
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or sealing. This legislative policy is significant because both sections
638.02 and 242.31 deal with restoration of civil rights to first offend-
ers. The only difference between the two sections is that section
242.31 applies solely to youthful offenders, whereas section 638.02
may apply to offenders of any age. Since the youth of an offender has
always been given special importance in questions of rehabilitation,'
it would be incongruous to permit expungement of an adult pardo-
nee's record but not that of a rehabilitated youthful offender. Both
courts and commentators have consistently construed section 242.31
to have the "salutary purpose of removing the stigma which follows
the conviction of a crime from the life of a young person who has been
reformed and rehabilitated and is about to be returned to society."'"
Thus, the parallel language of sections 638.02 and 242.31, along with
the basic policies underlying youth conservation, justifies the court's
broad interpretation."
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the district court order
to expunge the arrest record of the third respondent, R.L.F.2 R.L.F.
had sought expungement on the theory that it was within the inher-
ent, equitable powers of the court to balance the law enforcement
value of arrest record retention against the potential damage to an
arrestee.03 He argued that if the state could not show a compelling
reason for retention, the court should order expungement."1 Refusing
59. See generally Gough, supra note 22.
60. State v. Meyer, 228 Minn. 286, 299, 37 N.W.2d 3, 12 (1949). See generally
Note, Sentence and Release of Youthful Offenders, 34 MwN. L. REv. 532, 532-33 (1950).
61. Not all courts would agree. See, e.g., Fite v. Retail Credit Co., 386 F. Supp.
1045 (D. Mont. 1975) (there is no general policy against allowing full disclosure of
juvenile arrest records to credit company); In re Raynor, 123 N.J. Super. 526, 303 A.2d
896 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973) (statutory provision for the expungement of record of
conviction does not authorize expungement of arrest record despite the fact that lan-
guage in a similar statute has been so construed).
62. See 256 N.W.2d at 807. The district court also set aside R.L.F.'s conviction,
but this ruling was not appealed by the state, and the reversal by the supreme court
presumably affected only the expungement order. There was apparently some doubt
as to this fact, however, for the issue was raised by counsel for R.L.F. in a petition for
rehearing. Respondent's Petition for Rehearing at 2-4, 7, In re R.L.F., 256 N.W.2d 803
(Minn. 1977). The petition was denied on August 30, 1977, without benefit of a clarify-
ing opinion. In re R.L.F., 256 N.W.2d 803 (Minn. 1977).
Analytically, it is unlikely that the supreme court would have reversed the district
court's order setting aside the conviction. R.L.F. had met the statutory requirement
for having his conviction set aside. See MINN. STAT. § 609.166 (1976), quoted at text
accompanying note 76 infra. Thus, the order of the district court was an exercise of
discretion specifically granted by the legislature, which the supreme court could re-
verse only if it found that the discretion had been abused.
63. This approach has been employed by a number of courts. See, e.g., Davidson
v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 132-33, 503 P.2d 157, 162 (1972); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App.
334, 345, 487 P.2d 211, 217 (1972).
64. See 256 N.W.2d at 807.
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to apply such a test,65 the court disposed of R.L.F.'s case by making
two summary findings. First, there was no statutory authority for the
expungement of R.L.F.'s record." Second, there was no "serious in-
fringement" of R.L.F.'s constitutional rights arising from retention of
his record and thus the court could not use its inherent powers" to
order expungement.1"
Standing alone, the court's conclusions with respect to R.L.F.
would, perhaps, be unremarkable," but their perfunctory nature and
the formalism that underlies them stand in stark contrast to the
broad statutory constructions and the general sensitivity to the de-
mands of equity that characterized the court's treatment of R.D.K.
and G.E.S.
The court's consideration of R.L.F.'s statutory grounds for ex-
pungement was limited to the blunt conclusion that "[in this case,
as distinguished from the other two incorporated in this trilogy of
appeals, we have no statutory authority to guide us in determining
whether the court had the power to expunge the records." 0 It is true
that, read narrowly, none of the provisions of the Minnesota Statutes
dealing with arrest records provides R.L.F. with statutory grounds for
65. Had the court applied a balancing test, it would have found a strong case
for expungement. R.L.F.'s misdemeanor arrest record was ten years old. Subsequent
to his release, his record was spotless. He settled down, began a family, and was
steadily employed. Brief for Appellant app., at A-4, In re R.L.F., 256 N.W.2d 803
(Minn. 1977) (State's brief in State v. R.L.F.) (Affidavit of R.L.F., Dec. 13, 1975).
Clearly, the law enforcement value of retaining his record was not great. Moreover, the
court did not dispute the contention that R.L.F.'s record would hinder his efforts to
secure employment with a suburban police force. See 256 N.W.2d at 807.
66. See 256 N.W.2d at 807.
67. The "inherent powers" of a court are those powers that it possesses as a
natural consequence of being a court: the powers necessary for it to function as an
independent judicial body and to do justice. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 98 Ariz.
74, 77, 275 P.2d 887, 889 (1954):
The "inherent powers" of a court are an unexpressed quantity and undefina-
ble term, and the courts have indulged in more or less loose explanations
concerning it. Undoubtedly, courts of justice possess powers whicfi were not
given by legislation and which no legislation can take away. There are
"inherent powers" resident in all courts of superior jurisdiction. These pow-
ers spring not from legislation but from the nature and constitution of the
tribunals themselves.
68. See 256 N.W.2d at 808. The court reasoned that an exercise of inherent power
should not be favored where the legislature has formulated statutory guidelines. As a
result, expungement of arrest records was generally limited to cases falling within a
statutory provision, with the courts' "inherent power" to order expungement reserved
for those extreme cases where retention of the record would result in serious infringe-
ment of the arrestee's constitutional rights. See id.; text accompanying notes 88-90
infra.
69. See notes 28 & 30 supra and accompanying text.
70. 256 N.W.2d at 807.
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expungement. 7' The court's reading of the statutes governing the ex-
pungements of R.D.K. and G.E.S., however, was anything but nar-
row. 72 If the same expansive approach to statutory construction had
been used in the case of R.L.F., the court probably would have
reached a different conclusion.
R.D.K.'s arrest record was expunged under section 299C.11 of
the Minnesota Statutes. Read literally, this statute would not apply
to R.L.F. for two reasons. First, section 299C.11 applies only to per-
sons arrested for gross misdemeanors and felonies." R.L.F. was ar-
rested for a simple misdemeanor. Second, section 299C.11 provides
for return of arrest records "[ulpon the determination of all pending
criminal actions or proceedings in favor of the arrested person.""
R.L.F. was convicted. Neither of these differences, however, raises an
insurmountable barrier to expungement.
If R.L.F.'s conviction was the principal reason for not applying
299C.11, the court's failure to consider the fact that his conviction
had been set aside pursuant to section 609.166 of the Minnesota
Statutes75 is inexplicable. Under that statute,
[a]ny person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony, gross
misdemeanor or misdemeanor may move the convicting court for
the entry of an order setting aside the conviction where:
(a) the offense was committed before he was 21 years of age;
(b) five years have lapsed since the person has served the sen-
tence imposed upon him or has been discharged from probation,
71. R.L.F. apparently had an alternative to judicial expungement of his arrest
records. Under MINN. STAT. § 638.02 (1976), he could have petitioned the state board
of pardons for a "pardon extraordinary." See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying
text. A grant of a "pardon extraordinary" would have entailed a sealing of his records
and restriction of their use to future judicial proceedings. However, since expungement
under section 638.02 is administered by the board of pardons and not by the court,
this section, though applicable to R.L.F., does not support a judicial expungement
power. See generally Gough, supra note 22, at 166 (discussion of administrative versus
judicial expungement).
72. See text accompanying notes 34-61 supra.
73. One of the reasons section 299C.11, when read literally, is inapplicable to
misdemeanants is that it applies only to the BCA. Since the BCA collects only records
of gross misdemeanor and felony arrests, see MINN. STAT. § 299C.11 (1976), a statute
allowing misdemeanor arrestees to retrieve their records from the BCA would be of no
value. In its treatment of R.D.K., however, the R.L.F. court extended the scope of
section 299C.11 to cover "all entities which gather [arrest] information for the BCA."
256 N.W.2d at 805. See text accompanying notes 52-53 supra. Because of this broad
construction, section 299C.11 may now provide any misdemeanor arrestee with a statu-
tory basis for requesting the expungement of records held by county and municipal
police.
74. MINN. STAT. § 299C.11 (1976) (emphasis added).




and during the five year period the person has not been convicted
of a felony or gross misdemeanor; and
(c) the offense is not one for which a sentence of life imprison-
ment may be imposed."
R.L.F. met the requirements set by the legislature in section 609.166.
Obviously, he also convinced the district court judge to exercise his
statutorily authorized discretion to set aside the conviction." There-
fore, by both legislative and judicial determination, R.L.F.'s convic-
tion was no longer necessary to the state's criminal justice system,
and he was "deemed not to have been previously convicted."7
Unless this legislative mandate is nugatory, R.L.F. cannot be
distinguished from R.D.K. on the basis of his conviction. To do so
would give legal effect to a conviction that the legislature has com-
manded should be meaningless. Thus, the only basis for distinguish-
ing R.L.F. from R.D.K. was the fact that R.L.F. was convicted of a
misdemeanor. As the court itself noted in City of St. Paul v.
Froysland,5 however, it makes little sense to deny the benefits of
section 299C.11 to an otherwise eligible arrestee simply because his
crime is less serious.8" In short, there was no principled way to distin-
76. MINN. STAT. § 609.166 (1976).
77. See id. § 609.167(3).
78. Id. § 609.168 (effect of court order setting aside a conviction).
79. 246 N.W.2d 435 (Minn. 1976).
80. "[Section 299C.11] only applies by its express terms to felonies and gross
misdemeanors. However, as the trial court ruled, logic seems to dictate that the appar-
ent legislative policies underlying the statute extend to less serious crimes and crimi-
nals, i.e., misdemeanors." Id. at 439 n.5.
Froysland involved a woman who was arrested for disorderly conduct, a misde-
meanor. She pled guilty, but the judge stayed imposition of sentence for six months,
pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 609.135 (1976). After the defendant successfully completed
the six month stay, her conviction was vacated and charges were dismissed. She
petitioned the court for return of all identification data and expungement of her arrest
record pursuant to section 299C.11. The municipal court refused her request, and the
supreme court affirmed, holding "that a dismissal of charges following a stay of imposi-
tion of sentence is not a determination in favor of the accused within the meaning of
Minn.St. 299C.11." 246 N.W.2d at 439.
Since Froysland appears, at least facially, to be strong precedent for the result in
R.L.F., the court's failure to cite it is mystifying. See also text accompanying notes
46-48 supra. The Froysland decision, however, is distinguishable from R.L.F.'s case on
two important grounds. First, although section 609.135 empowers the court to "dis-
charge" the arrestee after successful completion of stay, it does not specifically call for
setting aside his conviction. In contrast, section 609.168 contains a clear mandate that
the arrestee shall be "deemed not to have been previously convicted." Second, the
requirements for vacating a conviction under section 609.166, quoted at text accom-
panying note 76 supra, constitute a legislative determination of factors the conjunc-
tion of which would tend to negate the need for maintaining a record of a conviction.
These same factors would seem also to negate the need for keeping an arrest record.
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guish R.L.F. from R.D.K., and expungement under section 299C.11
was as appropriate for one as it was for the other.
But the court need not have gone that far. The reasoning em-
ployed-to justify expungement of G.E.S.'s arrest record under section
242.31 applies with identical force to section 609.168, making that
section itself an appropriate statutory basis for expunging R.L.F.'s
record. The court found statutory authority to expunge G.E.S.'s
record in the language of section 242.31, which provides that orders
issued under that section "'purge and free [the defendant] from all
penalties and disabilities arising from such conviction and it shall not
thereafter be used against him.' "I' Since arrest records are clearly not
"penalties and disabilities arising from [a] conviction," the statute,
read literally, cannot be said to authorize expungement of those re-
cords. Yet the court found in that language, without more, a "clear"
legislative intent to allow such expungement.2
With considerably less pomp but equal force, section 609.168
provides that where an order setting aside a conviction is issued pur-
suant-to sections 609.166 to 609.167, "the person shall be deemed not
to have been previously convicted."" Deeming a person not to have
been previously convicted is simply one way of purging him of "all
penalties and disabilities arising from the conviction." Moreover, like
section 242.31, section 609.168 is one of the statutes "in [the] field
dealing with youthful offenders.""4 As such, it shares with section
242.31 a common purpose: "to minimize or eliminate any adverse
consequences when there is only one conviction on an otherwise clean
record."' 5 Since the literal reach and policy basis of 242.31 and
609.168 are identical, it seems inconsistent to give them different
meanings with respect to arrest records. Not surprisingly, this incon-
sistency yields an inequitable result: G.E.S., a juvenile fefon, has his
record expunged; R.L.F., a juvenile misdemeanant, does not.
Even if the possible statutory bases for expungement were not
readily apparent to the court, the relative inequity of the result
should have been. It is the inevitability of such inequities that is the
principal weakness of a rigid requirement that expungement have a
statutory basis. As the case itself demonstrates, the court's apparent
conviction that the Minnesota statutory scheme is sufficiently exten-
There are no such requirements in section 609.135. Thus, since such different policies
applied to, the case of R.L.F., a strict construction modeled after Froysland was not
warranted.
81. 256 N.W.2d at 806.
82. See id.
83. MINN. STAT. § 609.168 (1976).




sive to preclude the need for judicial intervention to fill in the gaps "
is questionable. To bring R.D.K. and G.E.S. within the statutory
scheme required considerable imagination and a willingness to read
the statutes broadly. That willingness is not, however, as the court's
treatment of R.L.F. demonstrates, without limits. Inevitably, there
will be individuals who are indistinguishable, in terms of the equities
of their cases, from those protected, but who are nevertheless victim-
ized by discontinuities in the statutory scheme. By denying the exist-
ence of a judicial power to bridge those discontinuities directly, the
court in effect denies one of the principal purposes of its equitable
powers: to fill "the gaps and interstices in the law where the law
through neglect or oversight fails to protect individuals against hard-
ship and injury. 8 7
Be that as it may, under the court's ruling in R. L. F., the inherent
power of Minnesota courts "is limited to instances where the peti-
tioner's constitutional rights may be seriously infringed by retention
of his records." Applying this test to R.L.F., the court rejected the
argument that the state's retention of R.L.F.'s arrest records violated
his constitutional right of privacy and that expungement was there-
fore required unless the state could show a compelling interest in re-
taining the records. 81 Placing the burden of proof on R.L.F., the court
summarily concluded that no "serious infringement" would result if
the records were not expunged. 0 The court did not discuss the details
of its "serious infringement" test; it simply concluded that R.L.F.
failed to pass it.
86. See id. at 807. This is the necessary implication of the court's refusal to follow
decisions from states where courts have the inherent power to order expungement
because of a lack of statutory provisions. The court cited approvingly Loder v. Munici-
pal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 553 P.2d 624, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1976), where the "California
Supreme Court held that expungement would not be granted where the state legisla-
ture had provided an extensive body of legislation controlling the question." 256
N.W.2d at 807.
87. Mulkey v. Purdy, 234 So. 2d 108, 112 (Fla. 1970) (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
88. 256 N.W.2d at 808.
89. See Brief for Respondent R.L.F. at 8-11, In re R.L.F., 256 N.W.2d 803
(Minn. 1977). See generally Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 130, 503 P.2d 157, 161
(1972); Doe v. Commander, 273 Md. 262, 272, 329 A.2d 35, 41 (1974); Eddy v. Moore,
5 Wash. App. 334, 337, 487 P.2d 211, 213 (1971). In each of these cases, the court
balanced the law enforcement value of retaining the arrest record against the damage
that its existence might do to the arrestee. In Eddy, the Washington Court of Appeals
cited Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), to support its contention that
[w]e have now reached the point where our experience with the require-
ments of a free society demands the existence of a right of privacy in the
fingerprints and photographs of an accused who has been acquitted, to be
at least placed in the balance, against the claim of the state for a need for
their retention.
5 Wash. App. at 345, 487 P.2d at 217.
90. See 256 N.W.2d at 808.
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To the extent that R.L.F.'s argument was based on a federal
constitutional right of privacy the Minnesota Supreme Court was
probably correct in rejecting it, for the argument was seriously under-
mined by the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Paul v. Davis."1 In that case, Davis was arrested for shoplifting. He
was fingerprinted and photographed by police. Before he was tried,
however, police distributed a listing of "active shoplifters" to local
merchants. The list included the arrestee's name and "mugshot,"
despite the fact that he had never been convicted. The Court, in an
opinion by Justice Rehnquist, held that Davis may have had a cause
of action for defamation against the local police, but the misuse of
his arrest records violated neither his right of privacy nor due process
of law." If the constitutional right of privacy does not protect against
illegal dissemination of the arrest record of a nonconvicted arrestee,
it seems clear that it would not bar mere retention of the records of a
convicted arrestee.1
In light of Paul v. Davis, it is difficult to conceive of any substan-
tial constitutional argument that a convicted arrestee like R.L.F.
could offer to satisfy the Minnesota court's "serious infringement"
test. R.L.F. thus leaves Minnesota with a broadened statutory
scheme for expungement of arrest records, but it narrows the inherent
power of expungement to a point where, practically, it ceases to exist.
Expansion of the former does not fill the void left by restriction of the
latter, and the net result is a substantial loss of judicial flexibility.
91. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Another possible reason for rejecting the privacy argu-
ment is that the cases cited in support of that argument, see note 89 supra, differ from
R.L.F.'s case insofar as they dealt with arrestees who had not been convicted. The
court may have implicitly ruled in R.L.F. that, in any balancing of public good versus
individual privacy, the fact of conviction will always tip the scale for retention of
records. In fact, it appears that no court has ever expunged a convicted arrestee's
criminal file on the argument that its retention would infringe his right of privacy.
See Alderman v. Shiawassee County Sheriff, 66 Mich. App. 649, 653, 239 N.W.2d
696, 698 (1976) ("Plaintiffs have not shown us any case, nor 'has our independent
research disclosed any case, in which an individual, after conviction, had a claim
based upon privacy to return of arrest records."). However, the fact of conviction in
the case of R.L.F. is a singularly unconvincing rationale for disallowing expungement.
See notes 75-78 supra and accompanying text.
92. The Supreme Court stated that the right of privacy, as formulated in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 479 (1973), was
limited in scope to analogous situations: "matters relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education." 424 U.S. at 713.
The Court also found that since Davis had alleged no actual economic harm, but only
damage to his reputation, there was no deprivation of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. See id. at 712.
93. See Hammons v. Scott, 423 F. Supp. 618 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (citing Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)) (nonconvicted arrestee denied expungement of arrest
record on state constitutional grounds).
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The immediate effect of this loss is apparent in the court's treatment
of R.L.F., an arrestee whose case seemed eminently suited to ex-
pungement,"4 but who was denied relief because the court found no
statutory basis for his claim. By narrowing the scope of the courts'
inherent power and limiting the availability of expungement to cases
within the provisions of the Minnesota Statutes, the court arrived at
a result that is harsh and inequitable.
In the future, the problems posed by the R.L.F. decision could
be resolved in two ways. First, Minnesota courts could accommodate
petitioning arrestees who lack an explicit statutory basis for expunge-
ment by giving a broad reading to the "serious infringement of consti-
tutional rights" test under the aegis of a right of privacy protected
by the state constitution. 5 Adoption of a broad right of privacy would
permit the courts to weigh the law enforcement value of retaining
records against the detrimental effect on the arrestee. This would
amount to the same judicial balancing that takes place under an
"inherent" powers rationale. The court would simply be doing it in
a constitutional mode, as required by the holding in R.L.F
The second remedy for the problems apparent in R.L.F. is a
balancing of interests, not in the courts, but in the legislature. This
approach would respond directly to the implication in R.L.F. that,
in the future, the legislature must determine state policy concerning
arrest record expungement15 Should the legislature choose to rethink
94. See note 65 supra.
95. Although the majority opinion in Paul v. Davis seemed to foreclose an expan-
sive view of the right of privacy as a federal constitutional guarantee, see notes 91-93
supra and accompanying text, Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent that a state
forum could still adhere to broader protection of the right of privacy under its state
constitution. See 424 U.S. at 735 n.18.
The Minnesota Constitution does not explicitly guarantee a right of privacy, nor
has the Minnesota Supreme Court ever construed the state constitution to include
such a right. In the past, however, the court has employed a "penumbral" reading of
article I of the Minnesota Constitution, see Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 217
Minn. 218, 225, 14 N.W.2d 400, 405 (1944), similar to the type of reading by which
the United States Supreme Court recognized the federal right of privacy, see Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
96. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
97. The state right of privacy argument has been rejected in several cases from
other jurisdictions. One of these cases, Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 553
P.2d 624, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1976), was cited by the R.L.F. court. 256 N.W.2d at 807.
This suggests that, when the issue arises, the Minnesota Supreme Court will not
recognize a right of privacy arising out of the state constitution.
98. Implicit in the Minnesota court's resolution of R.L.F. was an unwillingness
to determine the contours of expungement availability and a desire to rely upon statu-
tory guidelines. The court offered no explanation in constitutional or in jurisprudential
terms for shifting the focus of discretion from the judiciary to the legislature. Discus-
sion of the theory of inherent powers in other cases, however, indicates that the court's
reasoning may have its basis in the concept of coequal branches of government. See,
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its expungement guidelines, it might look to recent developments in
California.9 The focus of efforts in California has been on control of
dissemination and prevention of prejudicial use of arrest records."®
To assure that records are accurate and complete, California statutes
now provide that all records of arrest must include a disposition
statement."0 ' An arrest that does not result in conviction is a
"detention," ' a term that arguably has less potential for stigmatiza-
tion than "arrest." Moreover, to limit dissemination to law enforce-
ment agencies, the legislature has provided both civil and criminal
penalties for unauthorized dissemination.' 1 Finally, to avoid discrim-
ination against arrestees, California has enacted statutory prohibi-
tions against denial of employment, licensing, and personal advance-
e.g., Mulkey v. Purdy, 234 So. 2d 108, 111 (Fla. 1970) (Ervin, C.J., dissenting). Recog-
nition of this theory was intimated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in City of St.
Paul v. Froysland, 246 N.W.2d 435 (Minn. 1976), where it upheld a lower court's denial
of expungement for an arrestee who lacked a statutory basis for the relief sought: "'It
may or may not be sound social policy to extend the. . . protection [of expungement]
to persons in the class of this defendant. However, in the absence of a Constitutional
or statutory mandate, the courts ought not intrude into the record-keeping functions
of the executive branch."' Id. at 437 (quoting memorandum of the municipal court).
See also United States v. Bohr, 406 F. Supp. 1218 (E.D. Wis. 1976); In re Grand Jury,
244 N.W.2d 253, 257 (Minn. 1976).
99. See generally Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 553 P.2d 624, 132
Cal. Rptr. 464 (1976) (outlining the various provisions involving arrest records in Cali-
fornia, and using their extensiveness as a rationale for disallowing court-ordered ex-
pungement).
One commentator has suggested that another approach to legislative reform would
be codification of a "usefulness" criterion, arguing that, since the only rational basis
for retention of an arrest record is its value to the criminal justice system, retention
should be permitted only when it is demonstrably useful to that system. See Comment,
supra note 11, at 854-55.
100. California has no specific statutory authority for expungement, but there
are some provisions for "sealing" certain records. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.7
(West Supp. 1977) (exonerated juvenile misdemeanants); id. § 851.8 (specified adult
misdemeanants); id. § 1203.45 (convicted juvenile misdemeanants who have served
sentence); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 781 (West Supp. 1977) (specified juveniles).
101. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11115-11117 (West Supp. 1977). See also id. §§
11120-11127 (examination and correction of records by arrestee).
102. See id. § 849.5.
103. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7(b) (West Supp. 1977) (civil penalty provided
against employers who use arrest records to discriminate in hiring); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 11076 (West Supp. 1977) (records shall be disseminated only to authorized agencies);
id. § 11105(b)-(c) (listing of authorized agencies); id. §§ 11140-11144 (describing un-
lawful dissemination and prescribing criminal penalties).
Ordinary defamation and invasion of privacy actions may also be available to
those whose records have been wrongfully disseminated. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693, 711-12 (1976). But cf. Karst, "The Files". Legal Controls over the Accuracy and
Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAw & CoNmMP. Paoa. 342, 346.47 (1966)




ment based solely on a history of arrest.' "'
In comparison to Minnesota's legislation, which focuses only on
expungement, the California statutory scheme is superior for at least
three reasons. First, the prevention of widespread dissemination of
arrest record information protects all California arrestees.0 5 In Min-
nesota, only those eligible for expungement are protected, and those
who are ineligible, such as R.L.F., are afforded no relief at all. Sec-
ond, the California system allows retention of arrest records only for
strictly defined, legitimate law enforcement purposes.10  This limits
the detrimental effects that arrest record retention may have on an
individual and, at the same time, accommodates any realistic law
enforcement argument for retention. Third, under the California sys-
tem, the burden of assuring that an arrest record is not put to an
illegitimate use is on the criminal justice system.0 7 In Minnesota,
that burden is on the individual arrestee. If he is to have his record
expunged, he must come forward and petition the court. Thus, a
person in a position to secure private counsel is more likely to receive
the benefits of expungement than is a person who is unable to afford
counsel.'
Relegating the task of balancing the interests of social order and
individual rights to the legislature may be justifiable on several
grounds. The ability of a legislature to undertake extensive and inten-
sive empirical evaluations of relevant considerations may make it
104. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 461 (West Supp. 1977) (public licensing); CAL.
LAB. CODE § 432.7 (West Supp. 1977) (public and private employment). Although
R.L.F. would have benefited from the California provisions limiting dissemination, the
statutes preventing employers from using arrest records would not have protected him.
The California statute provides, "Persons seeking employment as peace officers or for
positions in law enforcement agencies with access to criminal offender record informa-
tion or for positions with the Division of Law Enforcement of the Department of Justice
are not covered by this section." Id.
105. But see, e.g., Alexander & Walz, Arrest Record Expungement in California:
The Polishing of Sterling, 9 U. S.F. L. Rsv. 299, 313 (1974). The authors criticize the
attempt to control dissemination as being impracticable because there are too many
disseminators. The fact that there are many disseminators, however, does not make a
clear case for allowing uncontrolled dissemination.
106. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105(b) (West Supp. 1977) (describing the limited
field of agencies to which the Attorney General is obliged to disseminate records and
the purposes to which they may be put); id. § 11105(c) (describing the agencies to
which the Attorney General may disseminate records upon a showing of a compelling
need).
107. See id. § 11077 (making the Attorney General responsible for protecting
criminal records, preventing their illegitimate dissemination and use, and instituting
training programs to teach security methods to those handling the records).
108. Arguably, those persons who cannot afford counsel may also be the ones
with the greatest need for the expungement remedy. See note 20 supra.
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better suited to balancing such considerations. 0 Moreover, this sort
of balancing may better reflect the public interest when done by a
representative body. Finally, legislation provides determinate guide-
lines, whereas judicial discretion produces only individual, ad hoc
determinations. ' 0 The Supreme Court of Minnesota may have been
cognizant of these concerns, but it articulated none of them. What is
distressing, therefore, about this apparent relegation of an important
judicial function to the legislature is the same thing that makes the
inconsistencies in the court's treatment of R.L.F. so hard to accept.
The problem is not so much that the conclusions were wrong as that
their justifications were so perfunctory and unenlightening.
109. See Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696,
699 (1962).
110. See, e.g., Statman v. Kelly, 47 Misc. 2d 294, 298, 262 N.Y.S.2d 799, 803
(Sup. Ct. 1965) (holding that expungement should not be granted where no statutory
authority existed because arrogation of legislative authority by the court would result
in compounded complications in individual instances).
1978]

